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Abstract
We study a simple traffic model with a non-signalized road intersection. In this model the car arriving from the right has
precedence. The vehicle dynamics far from the crossing are governed by the rules introduced by Nagel and Paczuski, which
define how drivers behave when braking or accelerating. We measure the average velocity of the ensemble of cars and its
flow as a function of the density of cars on the roadway. An additional set of rules is defined to describe the dynamics at the
intersection assuming a fraction of drivers that do not obey the rule of precedence. This problem is treated within a game-
theory framework, where the drivers that obey the rule are cooperators and those who ignore it are defectors. We study the
consequences of these behaviors as a function of the fraction of cooperators and defectors. The results show that
cooperation is the best strategy because it maximizes the flow of vehicles and minimizes the number of accidents. A rather
paradoxical effect is observed: for any percentage of defectors the number of accidents is larger when the density of cars is
low because of the higher average velocity.
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Introduction
Urban transportation systems are a source of numerous
inefficiencies and of negative externalities. Traffic problems
worsen due to heavy congestions; additionally there are environ-
mental issues such as smog and noise pollution, and huge
economic losses due to congested traffic. In order to improve
efficiency and reduce externalities it is important to understand
traffic dynamics in a controlled environment and to identify
optimal control strategies which could help alleviate the problem.
Traffic flow problems have received much attention for decades.
Many investigations have been carried out using different points of
view and considering various aspects of traffic phenomena, and
are evaluated in order to better understand the overall quality of
traffic flow. One of the main questions in the study of traffic is how
to better accommodate the demand for mobility in a system.
The pioneering traffic flow descriptions on a highway are
derived from observations made by Greenshields, first published
about 75 years ago [2]. Greenshields carried out tests to measure
traffic flow, traffic density and velocity using photographic
measurement methods for the first time. He was able to develop
a model of uninterrupted traffic flow that predicts and explains the
trends which are observed in real traffic.
Nowadays the search for the mechanisms behind the complex
interactions between drivers, vehicles and road infrastructure
continues. Also, traffic congestion has deteriorated considerably.
Recently traffic problems have attracted the attention of physicists
because of observed non-equilibrium properties and various
nonlinear dynamics phenomena. Several approaches have been
proposed to investigate the behavior of vehicular traffic. Most of
the approaches are classified into macroscopic and microscopic
models based on how the movement of vehicles is considered.
In the macroscopic approach a traffic stream is viewed as a
continuous medium. The collective vehicle dynamics is described
in terms of the spatial vehicular density per lane and the average
velocity as a function of the freeway location and time. The first
major step in macroscopic modeling of traffic was carried out by
Lighthill and Whitham in 1955 [3], when they compared the
‘‘traffic flow on long crowded roads’’ with ‘‘flood movements in
long rivers’’. A year later, Richards (1956) [4] complemented the
idea by introducing ‘‘shock-waves on the highway’’ with an
identical approach. That is the origin of the LWR model. It is
common to refer to this class of models as first-order models.
Another kind of macroscopic model, second-order models, contain
an additional partial differential equation for the average velocity
and take into account the finite relaxation time to adapt the
velocity to changing traffic conditions [5,6].
In the microscopic approach the motion of each vehicle in a
traffic stream is considered. Thus, the dynamic variables of the
model represent microscopic properties such as the position and
velocity of a single vehicle. The so-called car-following models
focus on the non-linear interaction and dynamics of single vehicles.
The driving behavior of a vehicle depends significantly on the
motion of the preceding vehicle: the acceleration is a function of
the vehicle’s distance to the preceding one and of its own and
relative velocities [7–9]. These models are used only for detailed
studies (e.g. on-ramp traffic, bottlenecks, effects of traffic optimi-
zation measures), as they consume an enormous amount of CPU
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time because of the large number of variables involved. An
alternative approach are cellular automaton (CA) models, which
permit the simulation of a minimal model of traffic dynamics faster
than real-time simulations [1,10,11]. Cellular automata use integer
variables to describe the dynamic properties of the system by
discretizing space and time. The Nagel-Schreckenberg (NaSch)
model [10] is a basic CA model describing a one-lane traffic flow.
Based on this model many CA have been extended to investigate
the properties of systems with realistic traffic factors such as
highway junctions, crossings, tollbooths and speed limit zones [12–
14].
An extensive and generous overview of traffic modeling can be
found in a review article by Helbing [15]. He considers empirical
data and reviews the main approaches to modeling pedestrian and
vehicular traffic. Control strategies including ramp metering
[16,17], and variable speed limits [18] have also been widely
studied.
At the most basic level, traffic dynamics are often discussed on a
homogeneous roadway. Next it becomes necessary to consider
road intersections. Modeling intersections is difficult, since
intersection models are phenomenological by nature. They
describe, for instance in the case of a merge, the local priority
rules.
At an intersection a limited space must be shared by vehicles
from different directions. Various approaches have been used to
resolve the obvious traffic conflicts. There are schemes that require
a vehicle to come to a full stop, e.g. stop signs or traffic lights.
Other types of schemes try to avoid the full stop of vehicles, like
traffic circles or roundabouts [19,20].
In this paper we extend the original discrete model proposed by
Nagel and Paczuski [1] in order to account for a non-signalized
intersection. This is a common problem in street intersections
within cities, particularly in old cities where crossings are neither
rotatory nor signalized. Earlier, Zhang et al. [21] considered the
intersection problem within a game-theory framework, and will be
revisited in the next sections. Perc [22] has also studied the effect
of competing strategies in a different discrete traffic model. In this
paper we study the effects of cooperator or defector behavior on
the flow and average velocity of vehicles, as well as the incidence of
accidents when cars do not stop at crossings.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we define
the model and the rules that describe the behavior of vehicles on
the street and at an intersection. Next we describe the setting of the
simulations and present the results obtained. Finally, we conclude
and discuss the potential relevance of this work to the solution of
the problems of real traffic.
Model and Methods
Let us present a model for traffic dynamics at a single
intersection and describe the flow in the system. We choose to
model the motion of a vehicle on a single lane street using the
automaton rules proposed by Nagel and Paczuski [1]. The
interaction of vehicles arriving at the intersection, and which one is
going to pass first, is determined by the set of rules that we will
specify hereafter.
We consider a system of two streets, s1 and s2, that cross at a
given point X . The streets have a defined sense of circulation:
South to North for s1 and East to West for s2 (see Fig. 1). Each
street is a ribbon with L slots, with periodic boundary conditions.
On each street we place N vehicles (initially at random), giving
linear density r~N=L, and identified by an index i. Double
occupancy of the sites is prohibited (except at X ). Following Ref.
[1] we consider a variable associated with the distribution of cars
in the streets, the gap gi, that is the number of empty sites in front
of car i up to the car ahead. At the intersection the gap needs
further specification, as will be explained below.
Each car has a time-dependent velocity vi(t) that takes discrete
values between 0 and vmax. Time proceeds discretely, and vi is the
number of sites each vehicle advances during one time step. At the
beginning of the simulation all cars have zero velocity.
For the purpose of defining the interaction at the crossroad we
identify the cars nearest to the intersection as c1 and c2 (in streets
s1 and s2 respectively). Streets are equivalent, i. e. the same traffic
rules are applied to both streets.
General rules of vehicle motion
Firstly, let us describe the dynamics of a vehicle away from the
intersection. For every configuration of the model, one iteration
consists of the following steps, performed simultaneously for all
vehicles:
1. If giƒvi(t){1, car i will reduce its velocity as follows:
(a) With probability q: vi(tz1)~gi.
(b) With probability (1{q): vi(tz1)~gi{1 (overbrake, with a
further reduction of velocity).
2. If gi§vi(t)z1 and vi(t)vvmax, the car will accelerate as
follows:
(a) With probability p: vi(tz1)~vi(t)z1.
(b) With probability 1{p: vi(tz1)~vi(t) (keep the same
velocity).
3. If gi~vi, or if vi~vmax and the gap is gi§vmax, the velocity vi
does not change.
4. After updating the velocities, each car advances vi(tz1) sites.
Note that, in rule 2, Nagel and Paczuski [1] consider
p~q~1=2. We prefer to keep some flexibility in the choice of
the probabilities. In the simulations reported below we set
vmax~5, but any value vmax§2 gives the same qualitative
behavior.
Dynamics at the intersection
In order to define the rules that regulate the movement of
vehicles at the uncontrolled intersection, one needs to determine
the priorities when crossing the intersection, just like in real
crossroads, making the transit fluid and avoiding collisions.
Zhang et al. [21] considered a similar problem in a game
theoretical framework. In their model, drivers approaching the
intersection behave either as cooperators (C) or defectors (D),
allowing (or not) the cars arriving on the other street to pass.
Furthermore, drivers always adopt complementary strategies, that
Figure 1. Two intersecting streets. Cartoon showing the geometry
of the model and basic notation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061876.g001
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is, if c1 is C (D), then c2 is D (C). Thus the dynamics at the
intersection is deterministic, since all pairs are of C–D or D–C
type, and cooperators will always let the defectors cross. Zhang et
al. set the probability of cooperating between 0 and 0:5 (and the
probability of defecting between 0:5 and 1). Since cooperators stop
at the intersection, the street with the larger number of defectors
exhibits an average velocity higher than the other one. However,
the average total flow of both streets appears to be rather
independent of the probability of cooperation.
We believe that the use of cooperating and defecting strategies is
a fair approach for the description of the interaction of drivers at
crossroads in many real situations. A true game description must
take into account the full set of possible interacting strategies. That
is, drivers arriving at the intersection may as well be both
cooperators (C–C) or defectors (D–D). Since the authors of Ref.
[21] penalize only cooperators, it is better to be a defector, and it
results that a driver should not behave a priori in a cooperative way.
It is precisely due to the relative payoffs of the complete set of
interactions that the formal games of Hawks and Doves or
Prisoner Dilemma gain their interest in the description of social
systems.
In our model a driver has a strategy that determines his
behavior at the intersection. These are set at random at the
beginning of the simulation, with probability pc for cooperation
and (1{pc) for defection. In order to avoid deterministic or
synchronization artifacts arising from the periodic boundary
conditions, when a car reaches the end of the lane and re-enters
the street, drivers are reassigned new strategies, at random with
the same probability pc. In this way, heterogeneity in drivers’
behavior is incorporated in the model.
Let us specify the interaction at the crossroad in a way that
imitates what happens in real situations. We impose a single traffic
rule:
N Rule 1: Drivers must always yield to cars approaching from the
right.
Rule 1 is a widespread right-of-way traffic rule that applies for
equivalent streets in the absence of control devices in almost all
countries with a right-hand driving. If street s1 runs from South to
North, and street s2 from East to West (see Fig. 1), the driver c1
must respect the priority of c2 and let him pass first. However,
traffic rules are not always respected, and some drivers may try to
cross disregarding the rule. This behavior may impact the traffic
flow in different ways depending on the density of cars, and it is the
phenomenon that we aim to study.
We define the following strategies:
N Cooperate: abide by Rule 1.
Figure 2. The ordering effect of the intersection. Plot of the car’s positions (horizontal axis) as a function of time (vertical axis) for p~q~0:5,
pc~0:5, r~0:2. Cars move from left to right and the time increases downwards. A: Nagel-Paczuski model [1]; B: our model (street 1). Empty sites are
represented by white dots, sites that are occupied by a car are represented by a specific colored dot, where different colors correspond to different
velocities. Red dots stand for the cars with velocity v~1, orange for v~2, yellow for v~3, green for v~4, blue for v~5, and black for v~0. Note the
backward motion of the traffic jams.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061876.g002
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N Defect: ignore Rule 1.
The result of the interaction can be quantified in terms of a payoff
(rather, a cost) as the time that it takes to cross the intersection.
Cooperation results in a fluid flow, while interactions D–C, C–D
or D–D produce delays in the crossing. In order to implement this
we need to set up rules to define the gaps and velocities of cars c1
and c2, in addition to those of the rest of the system. These are the
following:
1. Determination of the gaps:
(a) If c1 (c2) is cooperator: The gap is measured as the distance
from the car to the intersection X (cooperators slow down
when approaching the intersection). (This rule applies only if
the car is at a site strictly less than X{1, otherwise it would
give g~0 and it would stop.).
(b) If c1 (c2) is defector: measure the gap as usual, up to the car
ahead.
(c) For either case: if there is a car at the intersection driving from
the other street, measure the gap up to X (neither C or D will
crash intentionally).
2. Determination of velocities:
(a) If c1 is cooperator and is at site X{1, it yields. If the velocity
of c2 is such that it will cross the intersection, c1 sets its
velocity to 0 (‘‘stop at the intersection’’). However, if the
speed of c2 is not large enough to cross at that step, c1 sets its
velocity according to the general rule and keeps advancing.
Note that c1 yields disregarding the strategy of c2.
(b) If c1 is defector and c2 is cooperator, both may try to cross at
the same time (if their velocities are large enough to allow it
in the current time step). In this case, the velocities are set up
in such a way that cars advance only up to the intersection
(not further, not before). This rule slightly favors the right
hand driver (the cooperator) with respect to the left hand one
(defector), by penalizing the defector (with a reduction of
speed). However, neither car stops. This simulates an
‘‘almost crash’’, where both drivers lose some time (the
Figure 3. The three phases of traffic. The flow as a function of the density in streets s1 [A and C] and s2 [B and D]. A system with p~q~0:9
appears in the left column [A and B], with the more noisy case of p~q~0:5 shown next to it [C and D]. The curves show the behavior for three
different values of the probability of cooperation pc : 0, 0.5 and 1, as shown in the legends.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061876.g003
Figure 4. The effect of cooperation. The total flow w vs. the
probability of cooperation pc , for different values of the density. For
small and medium densities the flow is not monotonous, showing a
maximum at an intermediate value of pc . For high densities the flow
decreases with pc .
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061876.g004
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defector more than the cooperator). At the next time step
they will accelerate if it is allowed by the traffic density.
(c) If c1 and c2 are defectors, both may try to cross at the same
time (again: both speeds need to be large enough given their
current positions). In this case neither car yields, and we
penalize both of them with a crash. Cars are given velocities
just enough to bring them to the intersection, and they are
flagged to have their speeds set to 0 the next time step. So they
will stay at X one more time step, causing interruption of the
traffic flow, which will pile up behind them. The next time
step cars will accelerate if allowed by the traffic density.
Given this set of rules, we performed various simulations. In the
next section, we present the results obtained.
Results and Discussion
In the simulations, the length of each street is L~1000 sites. N
cars are distributed at random in each street, giving a density
r~N=L. Starting with an initial condition in which all vehicles
have zero velocities, we wait a reasonable transient time in order
to obtain a stationary phase, defined by the average velocity in
both streets. We then calculate the flow of cars, defined as the
average velocity times the density, w~SvTr, additionally averaged
over the stationary state. We also calculate various statistical
properties of the distribution of velocities.
Let us first observe a comparison between a pure Nagel system
and street s1 of our model (Fig. 2). System parameters correspond
to a rather noisy behavior of the drivers, with p~q~0:5, and a
density of r~0:2 cars per site. For the case of the pure Nagel
system (see Fig. 2.A), there are congestion clusters (jams), which
are formed randomly due to velocity fluctuations of the cars.
These cars either stop moving or move very slowly, and can
accelerate to full speed only after having left the jam, keeping this
velocity until the next one. Thus, the stationary state is
characterized by an inhomogeneous mixture of jam free regions
and higher density jammed regions. These jammed regions
decrease the average flow in the system. In Fig. 2.B we show the
results of our model. We observe that, from the beginning, the
intersection acts as an ordering defect. Even if its action is local, its
effect is far reaching. When the cars reduce their velocity, and
even stop at the intersection, a free space is created ahead of the
defect. After crossing the intersection cars can accelerate to
maximum velocity, resulting in an almost completely ordered flow
that persits downstream. So, the intersection acts as a source of
order in the traffic. By allowing vehicles to pass one at a time it
effectively destroys the spontaneous jams observed by Nagel.
Now we study macroscopic fundamental flow diagrams for a
variety of traffic scenarios. These diagrams show the relation
between the flow and the density and are represented in Fig. 3.
Three phases are observed: (1) a low density phase, with freely
flowing traffic at the maximum speed (where the flow grows
linearly with the density); (2) a high density phase, corresponding
to heavily congested traffic and very slow speed, with the flow
depending inversely on the density of cars; (3) an intermediate
density phase where the flow remains in a plateau independent of the
density and thus the average velocity is in inverse proportion to the
density. The first two phases are also present in Nagel-Paczuski’s
model [1]; the third phase has been observed by Zhang et al. [21].
The transition between the free flow phase and the plateau is a
crossover that, in street s1 (panels A and C in Fig. 3), appears as a
peak. We looked at the dynamics in this region in detail, and this
peak does not correspond to any abrupt phase transition. A close
up of one of the peaks appears as an inset in Fig. 3.A. The fast
reduction of flow in the yielding street (s1) must be interpreted,
precisely, as the yielding vehicles stopping, at the first stages of the
jamming produced by an increased density. We remark that, since
the flows in both streets are considered separately, the intersection
can be seen as a defect in the street. However, the fact that one of
the streets is the preferential one makes the flow different in the
yielding street and the preferential one.
We performed simulations for two pairs of values of the
probabilities p and q (see Model and Methods). On one side,
p~q~0:5 represents the behavior of undecided or cautious
drivers, which we call a noisy system. These are drivers that half of
the time do not accelerate to the maximum possible velocity, and
the rest of the time brake more than it is strictly necessary. This set
of values has been used by Nagel and Paczuski [1], and will serve
as a reference. Another pair of values, p~q~0:9, represents more
‘‘deterministic’’ drivers, who mostly try to optimize their motion.
Observe, in Fig. 3, that the behavior of the system is qualitatively
Figure 5. The distribution of velocity as a function of density.
The average velocity , the standard deviation and the skewness of the
distribution are plotted for pc~1 and p~q~0:9.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061876.g005
Figure 6. Crashes. Number of crashes per cars per unit time, as a
function of density. The curves correspond to the case p~q~0:5, for
three values of the density of cooperators (as shown in the legend).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061876.g006
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the same in both cases. Nevertheless, the flow of the noisy system is
a little slower than the more deterministic one (the corresponding
curves on the left panels of Fig. 3 are higher than those on the
right). In addition, we explored a wide range of values for the
probability of cooperation pc, ranging from zero cooperators to a
fully cooperating system. As expected, the flow is the same in both
streets when pc~0 (all defectors, black squares). When pcw0 the
flow is greater in street s2 than in street s1. Observe that the impact
of cooperation is less relevant in the noisy case, p~q~0:5.
On Fig. 4 we plot the total flow as a function of the probability of
cooperation pc, for several fixed values of the density, in order to
visualize the effect of cooperation. This is shown for the two
scenarios, p~q~0:9 and p~q~0:5. The trends are similar in
both cases, even though the flow is greater for the deterministic
case. More interesting than this is the fact that, for less congested
systems, the dependence on cooperation is non monotonous.
There is a maximum flow at an intermediate value of pc, indicating
that an excess of cooperation may induce a jam at the intersection.
On the other hand, for high densities (e.g. r~0:7, as shown) the
flow monotonically decreases with the probability of cooperation.
Indeed, scenarios with very high densities usually perform better,
in real life, when drivers switch their strategies to a new one
(neither C nor D), alternating turns to cross the intersection,
instead of stopping constantly yielding to the vehicles on the right.
We must remark that the flow is an average measure of the
traffic. In order to get a complementary description we analyzed
the distribution of velocities. On Fig. 5 we plot the mean value, v,
the standard deviation, s and the skewness, k of this distribution,
as a function of the density r. One can see that for small densities
the velocity stays very near the maximum vmax (laminar flow), and
then sharply decreases when the cars start to pile up at the
intersection jam. The intermediate density region is a perfect
inverse power law r{1, corresponding to the plateau of the flow
that we showed before. A break in this law is seen at r&0:6,
corresponding to the beginning of the high density regime. The
standard deviation is close to zero in the laminar flow region.
Then, it starts to grow when the flow enters in the plateau region
and exhibits a maximum for intermediates values of the density,
indicating a big dispersion in the velocities. The dispersion
diminishes for high values of the density: the traffic becomes more
uniform and slower. For very high densities the average velocity is
very small and so is the standard deviation. The skewness of the
distribution complements this information. For small densities it is
negative, since the maximum of the distribution corresponds to
large values of the velocity. When increasing the density the
skewness goes through zero, indicating a symmetric distribution.
For high values of the density the distribution is centered at low
velocities, and the skewness is positive.
Another important variable to consider is the number of
crashes. A crash does not only cause a time delay in traffic but also,
in real systems, has an economic impact. In Fig. 6 we plot the
number of crashes per car and per unit time, x, as a function of the
density of traffic, for different values of the probability of
cooperation pc. One can see that there is a peak in the number
of accidents for low densities. This is due to the fact that even
though the number of cars is small they move fast, and then the
number of accidents per unit time is large. On the contrary, when
the density is high the average velocity is small and the number of
accidents per unit time decreases almost to zero. For all densities,
we also verify that the number of accidents decreases when
increasing the probability of cooperation (and goes to zero when
all drivers are cooperators). Also, more deterministic systems (not
shown), display more crashes due to the higher vehicle speed.
The correlation between the rate of crashes and the flow is
analyzed in Fig. 7. An hysteresis loop is observed. When the flow
increases at a low density the number of crashes increases very fast
(due to high vehicle speed), attaining a maximum when the flow
enters the plateau (for a density r&0:1). Within the plateau the
number of crashes diminishes and when the flow decreases at high
Figure 7. Correlation between crashes and flow. Relation between the flow and the number of crashes per car and per unit time for p~q~0:9
and two values of pc. In the right panel (B), follow the direction of the arrow when reading the description in the text.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061876.g007
Figure 8. Universality of crashes and cooperation. Crashes vs pc
in the case p~q~0:9, shown for four values of vehicle density.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061876.g008
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densities the number of crashes further decreases going finally to
zero at very high densities where the traffic goes to a standstill.
Finally, in Fig. 8 we show the number of crashes normalized by
the average velocity, x=v, vs the probability of cooperation pc. This
function decreases in a monotonic way when increasing the
probability of cooperation, as expected. Moreover, as the curves
corresponding to four values of vehicle density show, there is a
nearly universal exponential behavior as a function of the
cooperation, which is independent of the density. This behavior
could provide a good field test of our model in real situations. This
will be studied in further work.
Alternative rules
The rules of interaction between a defector in s1 and a
cooperator in s2 (rule 2.b) imply some advantage of the latter,
which is the opposite of some paradigmatic games of defection and
cooperation like the Prisoners’ Dilemma. In order to study this
point we have analyzed some alternative rules to 2.b. They may be
summarized as follows:
2.b1) The defector keeps his velocity as if the intersection did
not exist, while the cooperator reduces his velocity to arrive just to
the intersection at X . This rule clearly favors the defector by
penalizing the cooperator (who has the priority). The cooperator is
obliged to reduce his velocity and the situation is an almost crash,
but differently from the original rule, the defector is not penalized.
At the next time step the cooperator c2 accelerates from the point
X .
2.b2) A slight variant of 2.b1: c2 reduces his velocity to arrive
just to the intersection X and there stops, i.e. it will continue in the
next step accelerating from v~0. The situation for the defector is
the same as in rule 2.b1.
It is interesting and reassuring that these alternative rules
produce no significative changes in the presented results and for
this reason we do not include new figures. Some minor differences
arise when considering rule 2.b2 because the cooperators driving
in street s2 are obliged to stop completely at the intersection. Thus,
they exhibit a lower average speed. But these changes are not
relevant enough and show only small variations in the numerical
values of the measured variables when compared with the general
results already presented.
Conclusions
We studied the flow and speed of cars circulating on intersecting
one-lane streets, and where drivers coming from the right have the
precedence. The drivers may be cooperators—when they respect
the right precedence—or defectors if they ignore this rule. We
observed some significative trends in the results, that we detail
below.
The flow increases linearly with the density of cars for very low
densities and then remains constant for a wide range of densities.
For high densities the flow decreases dramatically to values very
near zero (see Fig. 2). This indicates the existence of two critical
densities: the first one when the system enters into the plateau of
constant flow and the second when it leaves the plateau. Within
the plateau region the flow is constant, suggesting that the street
has a ‘‘capacity’’ up to r*0:7. However, the width of the plateau
decreases with the number of defectors both in streets s1 and s2.
Also, ‘‘undecided’’ drivers that accelerate less that the maximum
possibility or brake more than needed reduce the global
performance: the flow is much lower when p~q~0:5 than when
p~q~0:9.
These results can be confirmed by observing the velocity as a
function of the density (Fig. 5). The velocity is maximum for low
densities, then decreases in inverse proportion to the density for
intermediate values and reaches zero for high densities. Again, the
plateau region provides a good traffic flow, but the dispersion of
the speeds is high.
It is curious that the behavior of cooperation or defection is not
very relevant. Indeed for intermediate or high densities of cars it is
more important to be a ‘‘decided’’ driver, accelerating or breaking
the maximum or minimum respectively, than to cooperate. The
maximum flow is obtained for half of the drivers being defectors
and for intermediate densities, or when all the drivers are defectors
for high densities. As a matter of fact, for high densities the
absolute respect of the right hand precedence can completely
block the circulation in street s1, a well known phenomenon in
many real traffic situations.
Nevertheless one must keep in mind that the defectors may be
particularly dangerous when the density is low. In this case the
average speed is high and the number of accidents can also be very
high (see Fig. 7).
One can conclude that a significant fraction of defectors is very
dangerous at low densities, or in regions of high speed, but a
number of them is necessary to increase the flow at intermediate or
high densities of cars. Indeed for very high densities the righ hand
precedence is annoying and alternate crossing should be preferred.
Comparison with real data are in progress, as is also the study of
two-lane streets and the comparison between non-signaled and
signaled crossings. Also, we plan to extend our model to the study
of two-dimensional block model cities, in the line of Refs. [23,24].
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